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Pretest of images associated with the expertise dimension
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In this paper, we present norms concerning the perceived association that two sets of stimuli (photos
of people and photos of objects) establish with the concept of expertise. Participants were presented
with a set of words associated with the expertise dimension and subsequently asked to judge each
stimulus on how much it related with the learned (expertise) dimension on a 7-point scale (1 – Not at
all related; 7 – Very related). The interpretation of means’ confidence intervals allowed us to
distinguish between images highly related with the expertise dimension and images highly unrelated
with this dimension. Summarized results are presented and photos made available to support future
research requiring stimuli associated with the expertise dimension.
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Introduction
Human beings are particularly good at perceiving someone’s level of expertise and, more
importantly, basing their decisions on such perception. We start by presenting the relevance of the
expertise dimension on the persuasion literature, its persuasive mechanisms, the methods by which
it has been and can be manipulated in a persuasive communication, and the relevance of the
validation of images associated with this dimension. With this work, we aim at offering the scientific
community material to support research that needs to manipulate the level of perceived expertise.
We test images from two categories (people and objects) for further use in different contexts and
experimental settings. We thus aim at presenting norms for a set of contemporary images of people
and objects regarding their perceived level of association with the expertise dimension.
Expertise and persuasion
The manipulation and activation of the expertise dimension may be relevant to areas of research
such as impression formation and perceived power, among others. However, the field that has
most studied this feature is communication, and especially persuasive communication.
Research on persuasion has revealed several processes through which attitudes form and
change, and a substantial amount of work aims at identifying the factors that determine how people
process persuasive messages (Clark, 2014). Source expertise is one of such factors and has been
one of the most widely studied factors in persuasion. This line of research has predominantly
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shown that people are more persuaded by experts than by non-experts (e.g., Chaiken &
Maheswaran, 1994; Heesacker, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1983; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Petty,
Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). In fact, from a set of persuasive sources found in the literature,
expertise seems to be the one that tends to have the greatest effect on persuasive communication,
with the greatest average of the explained variance being due to the expertise manipulation (Wilson
& Sherrell, 1993).
The mechanism through which this influence is exerted seems to be held at people’s belief that
“experts’ statements are valid”. People tend to act as they “endorse” the association of expertise
with credibility (e.g., Gotlieb & Sarel, 1991; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Maddux & Rogers, 1980;
McGinnies & Ward, 1980). This association may then guide judgments whenever information
regarding a source’s expertise is present, offering a heuristic route that supports those judgments.
Because expertise provides a direct link to attitude change (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986), when individuals have low motivation and low
resources to process the content of the persuasive message, the manipulation of this feature informs
about its persuasive processing. However, this as other variables of the persuasive context may also
influence other persuasion routes, depending on the motivation and capacity to process a persuasive
message. Specifically, persuasive cues like expertise can also: (a) bias thoughts related with a
persuasive message (e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994): (b) influence the degree of confidence
people hold in their thoughts (e.g., Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2006); (c) determine the extent to
which people scrutinize (e.g., Debono & Harnish, 1988; Heesacker, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1983; Tobin
& Raymundo, 2009) and pay attention to persuasive appeals (Debono & Harnish, 1988; Heesacker
et al., 1983; Moore, Hausknecht, & Thamodaran, 1986; Tobin & Raymundo, 2009).
Expertise manipulation
Research on the persuasion field has often relied on providing participants with biographical
information about the persuasive source (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As discussed, providing
information in form of a short description of source expertise may promote attitude change either
directly or indirectly by affecting the interpretation or the evaluation of the message.
However, impressions of a source can be also shaped in more ecological and spontaneous ways,
such as through visual cueing. In order to affect ads’ perceived credibility, advertisers commonly
make use of source expertise through, for example, the use of white lab coats, making one a
“doctor” or a “scientist”, or tidy black suits, making one a “financial expert”.
It is of common sense, and acknowledged, that a way used to judge a source’s expertise is
through his or her appearance (e.g., Aronson, 2004; Boucher, 2011; Brownlow, 1992; Nguyen &
Masthoff, 2007). Although perceived expertise is of particular interest in experimental contexts,
researchers have long manipulated this peripheral cue by simply selecting pictures in how
prototypical they appear in regard to the expertise dimension. Manipulation of source clothing
(e.g., semi-formal clothing vs. mechanic uniforms; Boucher, 2011), use of doctors as expert sources
(Nguyen & Masthoff, 2007), or manipulating the presence of medical equipment in these images
(Jiwa, Millet, Meng, & Hewitt, 2012), constitute examples of such operationalization.
However, methods through which expertise is visually manipulated scarce necessary validation.
Consequently, with this work, we aim at providing the scientific community material to support
research that needs to manipulate the level of perceived expertise.
Objective
Our objective with the present work is to provide material facilitating the research on this field,
by analyzing the perceived association of (1) potential source images and (2) familiar objects with
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the expertise dimension. We expect to show that objects are also associated with the expertise
dimension, supporting studies that do not want to use either images of people, nor words, or short
descriptions. As shown by Jiwa et al. (2012), objects such as medical instruments exert a positive
influence on the depicted person’s perceived trustworthiness, which relates with the expertise
dimension (Pornpitakpan, 2004). Here, we aim at showing that such expert-related objects are
also associated with the expertise dimension when presented by themselves. One of the main
advantages associated with the use of objects as experimental stimuli is the fact that these have
ecological validity (Bradley & Lang, 1999) whose processing of semantic meaning appears to be
fast (Carr, McCauley, Sperber, & Parmalee, 1982).




Seventy three Portuguese undergraduate Psychology students (57 females), with ages between
17 and 42 years-old (M=20.04; SD=3.50), participated in this laboratory study.
Material
Images of people and objects were selected from online image banks (e.g., Google images),
having as criteria: (1) the presence of only one object/person for image; (2) the objects are
represented in a white background; and (3) images have no copyright and are open access.
After selected, the images were digitally edited and standardized regarding their dimension,
resolution and color scale. Specifically, resulting images are in grayscale, with a resolution of
800x800 pixels.
Resulting stimuli consisted on a total of 80 images subdivided in two categories: 40 images of
objects and 40 images of people. These images were selected from a larger set, being pre-categorized
by 10 judges as belonging to an Expert and Non-Expert categories. The judged images that gathered
stronger consensus regarding their classification were selected for the final sample, resulting in 20
images for each of the 4 categories (Expert/Non-Expert objects, and Expert/Non-Expert people).
In order to study the association with expertise, we used a set of 12 words representing this
dimension. These words were selected from a larger set by 10 judges who evaluated them as those
best representing the expertise dimension. The words selected were: Specialized; Knowledgeable;
Intelligent; Qualified; Educated; Expert; Erudite; Competent; Skilled; Technical; Professional;
and Proficient1.
Measure and procedure
This study was conducted in a laboratory context using the E-prime software (Schneider,
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) v.2.0 for the presentation of the stimuli and data collection.
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1 Original words, as presented in Portuguese: Especializado, Conhecedor, Inteligente, Qualificado, Instruído,
Perito, Erudito, Competente, Hábil, Técnico, Profissional and Proficiente.
Participants were invited to participate in a study about “Evaluation of Images” with a mean
duration of 10 minutes. Participants provided informed consent, and anonymity and confidentiality
of data were assured.
Participants’ first task consisted on learning the expertise dimension. To this end, participants
were told they would be presented with a set of words with the objective of learning the construct
they represent. Instructions requested particular attention to these words and indicated that after
their presentation, the next task would consist on indicating for different images how these related
with the learned construct. Participants were instructed to press the Space tab and move on to the
subsequent task once they felt they had completely learned/comprehended the construct. In the
image evaluation task, participants evaluated a set of images according to the previously learned
construct, on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all related) to 7 (Very related).
In the image evaluation task, all images were randomly and individually presented on the
screen, along with the set of expert-related words on the superior section of the screen and the 
7-point scale on the lower section of the screen (see Figure 1). With this procedure, we aimed that
each image was evaluated for the expertise dimension without necessarily being evaluated for the
concept of expertise. This way, ratings based on a general and standardized expertise dimension
were obtained.
Figure 1. Still frame of the image evaluation task
To provide their answers, participants pressed one of the 7 number keys corresponding to the
scale. After finishing, participants were thanked for their participation and properly debriefed.
Results
Obtained results are summarized on Table 1 and Table 2. Data for evaluation means (construct-
image association), respective standard-deviations (translating the evaluations consensus), and
confidence intervals are presented. The images on Tables 1 and 2 are ascendingly ordered
according to the evaluation means.
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Through the analysis of the ratings confidence intervals, we were able to categorize the images
regarding their association with the Expertise dimension. To this end, images containing the mean
point of the scale (4) were classified as neutral (considering as neutral limits [3.5≥4.5]). Following
this criteria, we identified 11 images of people with low scores on the association with the expertise
dimension (from image 1 to 11), 8 images identified as neutral on this dimension (image 12-19),
and 21 images identified as high on the association with the expertise dimension (image 20-40;
Table 1).
Regarding the images of objects, we identified 26 images of objects with low scores on the
association with the expertise dimension (from image 1 to 26), 5 images identified as neutral on
this dimension (image 27-31), and 9 images identified as high on the association with the expertise
dimension (image 32-40; Table 2)2.
Table 1
Means, Standard-deviations, and confidence intervals associated with each image evaluated on
the “People” category
95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
01 2.438 (1.683) [2.05; 2.83] Non-Expert
02 2.452 (1.675) [2.06; 2.84] Non-Expert
03 2.493 (1.643) [2.11; 2.88] Non-Expert
04 2.712 (1.837) [2.28; 3.14] Non-Expert
05 2.808 (1.785) [2.39; 3.22] Non-Expert
06 2.877 (1.787) [2.46; 3.29] Non-Expert
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2 Additional analyses of the obtained evaluations showed that images previously classified as belonging to the
Expertise category were, indeed, perceived by participants as more related to this dimension compared to
the Non-Expert images, for both people category [Expert: M=5.95, SD=.98; Non-Expert: M=3.61, SD=.99;
t(72)=18.525, p<.001, d=2.37] and objects category [Expert: M=4.66, SD=1.23; Non-Expert: M=2.58,
SD=1.14; t(72)=18.402, p<.001, d=1.75].
95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
07 3.055 (1.817) [2.63; 3.48] Non-Expert
08 3.233 (1.867) [2.80; 3.67] Non-Expert
09 3.356 (1.896) [2.91; 3.80] Non-Expert
10 3.534 (1.908) [3.09; 3.98] Non-Expert
11 3.548 (1.826) [3.12; 3.97] Non-Expert
12 3.658 (1.887) [3.22; 4.10] Non-Expert
13 3.767 (2.045) [3.29; 4.24] Non-Expert
14 3.959 (1.918) [3.51; 4.41] Non-Expert
15 4.384 (1.838) [3.95; 4.81] Neutral
16 4.562 (1.833) [4.13; 4.99] Neutral
17 4.603 (1.824) [4.18; 5.03] Neutral
18 4.863 (1.946) [4.41; 5.32] Neutral
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95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
19 4.890 (1.752) [4.48; 5.30] Neutral
20 4.986 (1.852) [4.55; 5.42] Expert
21 5.301 (1.854) [4.87; 5.73] Expert
22 5.425 (1.666) [5.04; 5.81] Expert
23 5.671 (1.415) [5.34; 6.00] Expert
24 5.685 (1.526) [5.33; 6.04] Expert
25 5.781 (1.397) [5.45; 6.11] Expert
26 5.795 (1.384) [5.47; 6.12] Expert
27 5.822 (1.388) [5.50; 6.15] Expert
28 5.877 (1.423) [5.54; 6.21] Expert
29 5.945 (1.403) [5.62; 6.27] Expert
30 5.959 (1.327) [5.65; 6.27] Expert
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95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
31 5.973 (1.301) [5.67; 6.28] Expert
32 6.110 (1.329) [5.80; 6.42] Expert
33 6.137 (1.398) [5.81; 6.46] Expert
34 6.164 (1.014) [5.93; 6.40] Expert
35 6.164 (1.312) [5.86; 6.47] Expert
36 6.192 (1.287) [5.89; 6.49] Expert
37 6.192 (1.421) [5.86; 6.52] Expert
38 6.260 (1.179) [5.99; 6.54] Expert
39 6.260 (1.118) [6.00; 6.52] Expert
40 6.274 (1.083) [6.02; 6.53] Expert
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Table 2
Means, Standard-deviations, and confidence intervals associated with each image evaluated on
the “Object” category
95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
01 1.590 (1.311) [1.28; 1.89] Non-Expert
02 1.970 (1.323) [1.66; 2.28] Non-Expert
03 2.000 (1.590) [1.63; 2.37] Non-Expert
04 2.027 (1.590) [1.66; 2.40] Non-Expert
05 2.055 (1.471) [1.71; 2.40] Non-Expert
06 2.247 (1.801) [1.83; 2.67] Non-Expert
07 2.288 (1.504) [1.94; 2.64] Non-Expert
08 2.356 (1.751) [1.95; 2.76] Non-Expert
09 2.411 (1.681) [2.02; 2.80] Non-Expert
10 2.521 (1.901) [2.08; 2.96] Non-Expert
11 2.589 (1.763) [2.18; 3.00] Non-Expert
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95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
12 2.630 (1.882) [2.19; 3.07] Non-Expert
13 2.808 (1.883) [2.37; 3.25] Non-Expert
14 2.822 (1.953) [2.37; 3.28] Non-Expert
15 2.822 (1.782) [2.41; 3.24] Non-Expert
16 2.986 (1.837) [2.56; 3.41] Non-Expert
17 3.055 (2.054) [2.58; 3.53] Non-Expert
18 3.137 (1.946) [2.68; 3.59] Non-Expert
19 3.151 (1.998) [2.68; 3.62] Non-Expert
20 3.301 (1.970) [2.84; 3.76] Non-Expert
21 3.521 (2.008) [3.05; 3.99] Non-Expert
22 3.548 (1.901) [3.10; 3.99] Non-Expert
23 3.562 (1.965) [3.10; 4.02] Non-Expert
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95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
24 3.740 (2.273) [3.21; 4.27] Non-Expert
25 3.808 (2.106) [3.32; 4.30] Non-Expert
26 3.9452 (2.291) [3.41; 4.48] Non-Expert
27 4.014 (2.085) [3.53; 4.50] Neutral
28 4.260 (2.199) [3.75; 4.77] Neutral
29 4.850 (2.012) [4.38; 5.32] Neutral
30 4.890 (2.092) [4.40; 5.38] Neutral
31 4.904 (2.069) [4.42; 5.39] Neutral
32 4.986 (1.926) [4.54; 5.44] Expert
33 5.096 (1.945) [4.64; 5.55] Expert
34 5.178 (1.981) [4.72; 5.64] Expert
35 5.384 (1.761) [4.97; 5.79] Expert
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95% Confidence
Image Mean interval Expertise
number Stimulus (SD) for means association
36 5.493 (2.04) [5.02; 5.97] Expert
37 5.521 (1.811) [5.10; 5.94] Expert
38 5.658 (1.618) [5.28; 6.03] Expert
39 5.877 (1.691) [5.48; 6.27] Expert
40 5.877 (1.787) [5.46; 6.29] Expert
Discussion
The aim of this work consisted on the presentation of norms for a set of updated pictures for
the expertise dimension from two categories (people and objects). With the material here tested,
we hope to provide support for research carried out with the use of images that aim to manipulate
the expertise dimension, reducing the effort necessary to collect this type of stimuli.
Obtained results suggest a differentiation between images regarding their association with the
expertise dimension translated by the means’ confidence intervals, for both people and object
categories. As proposed, we were able to identify a set of images of objects associated with the
expertise dimension, providing support to studies that do not want to use either images of people
nor written descriptions in order to cue the expertise dimension.
However, it is important to keep in mind possible existing cultural differences regarding the
effects of source expertise. Research has provided evidence for cultural differences for the
persuasiveness of this cue, not only between Western and Eastern cultures (Pornpitakpan &
Francis, 2001), but also among Western cultures, between European countries (Hornikx & Hoeken,
2007). This way, it is important to test and to adapt these materials to confirm the norms here
present among different cultures.
Additionally, when using the material here tested, it should be kept in mind that a source’s
perceived expertise can also be topic dependent. That is, when presenting information about a
topic, a communicator might cue a higher expertise regarding some aspects but a lower expertise
on others. That would mean that a doctor might be more persuasive than an athlete when presenting
information regarding the benefits of exercise on health, but an athlete might have an advantage
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over a doctor when presenting information about fitness programs, as shown by Nguyen and
Masthoff (2007). Consequently, the selected images and their respective scores on the association
with the expertise dimension, although effective in representing the association with expertise on
a general sense, does not take into account these different persuasive contexts, which should be
taken into account when using this material in future studies.
We should also point out a possible limitation regarding the measure used to make participants
apprehend the expertise dimension. Our purpose was to use a measure that did not directly ask
participants to make judgments of “Expert”, “Specialized”, “Knowledgeable”, etc., but judgments
based on a general construct of expertise. Aiming to use this same measure for both people and
objects in order to have a set of words related with expertise regardless of the stimuli present,
there might have been some words that could be more related and applicable to people than objects.
Consequently, it is possible that such words could have conceptually distanced themselves from
the others. However, we do not believe that such operationalization affected the ratings leading
participants to misuse the learned construct, since the results show a clear significant differentiation
between images in their associations with the expertise dimension for both people and object
categories. The words elected by the judges as best representing the expertise dimension were
selected independently of a specific persuasive context. With this, we aimed at using a set of words
reflecting the general dimension of expertise. However, words such as “Erudite” or “Educated”
might refer to expertise domains in which a formal education can be perceived as necessary. If
such was the case, images reflecting expertise domains that do not necessarily require a formal
education might have been perceived as less associated with the expertise dimension. Again, this
emphasizes the need to take into consideration possible differences between persuasive contexts
when using the material here tested.
Overall, we provide here a subset of images with good inter-subject agreement, which can be
used in future different contexts and settings, with particular focus on experimental studies aiming
to study the direct or indirect effects of expertise-related images.
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Neste trabalho apresentamos normas de associação percebida de dois tipos de estímulos (imagens de
pessoas e imagens de objectos) com o constructo de “perícia” (expertise). Os participantes foram
expostos a um conjunto de palavras associadas com o constructo de perícia e subsequentemente
avaliaram cada imagem relativamente ao quanto estas se relacionam com o constructo aprendido numa
escala de 7 pontos (1 – Nada relacionada; 7 – Muito relacionada). A interpretação dos intervalos de
confiança das médias permitiu distinguir entre imagens altamente relacionadas com o constructo de
perícia e imagens não relacionadas com este constructo. Os resultados obtidos são apresentados e
discutidos e as imagens testadas são disponibilizadas de forma a apoiar futuros estudos que requisitem
estímulos associados ao constructo de perícia.
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